Hard Work: Youth Employment Programming in Honiara, Solomon Islands by Evans, Daniel
This paper will endeavour to: i) describe youth 
employment issues and constraints in Honiara; ii) 
examine international evidence and experience 
relating to job creation programs and their capac-
ity to address youth unemployment; iii) provide a 
summary of the two Honiara-based employment 
programs together with an overview of available 
data relating to their effectiveness (as well as a dis-
cussion of evidence gaps); and iv) within the lim-
its of the available evidence, assess the extent to 
which these programs are fostering youth work and 
addressing employment constraints in Honiara, 
reflecting lessons from international experience. 
A further point of discussion will be the extent to 
which these programs can be said to be contribut-
ing to increased social stability in the capital.
The first part of the paper commences with 
an overview of the position of youth in Solomon 
Islands, including a discussion of the youth labour 
market in Honiara and factors influencing the 
formal and informal employment dynamics of 
the country. A broader examination of Solomon 
Islands’ economic and sociocultural context is then 
provided, including issues of political economy. 
This analysis suggests that employment in the 
Solomon Islands context is, and will remain, differ-
ent from that experienced in many other contexts, 
requiring targeted policy responses. 
Having set the context for the analysis, the sec-
ond part of the paper commences with an over-
view of international practice in the area of youth 
employment programming, before turning to an 
overview of REP and Y@W, together with an assess-
ment of their achievements using 
available program data. Draw-
ing on this analysis, a number of 
tentative policy implications for 
current, and future, youth employ-
ment initiatives are presented. 
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Introduction
Across the Pacific, youth unemployment is regard-
ed by governments, donors and citizens as one of 
the region’s key concerns, not only because of its 
effect on economic advancement, but also because 
of a perceived association between joblessness and 
insecurity, including the prospect of youth-driven 
crime and violence. 
Over the last two decades, increased scholarly 
attention has been paid to the link between youth 
unemployment and issues of social instability, most 
famously heralded by Henrik Urdal and his ‘youth 
bulge’ theory (2004). While issues of causation can 
be difficult to assess, the Pacific, particularly Mela-
nesia, has seen this narrative take place in tandem 
with, or because of, rapid urbanisation which has 
been characterised by a growing cohort of unem-
ployed or underemployed, urban youth. This sce-
nario has been particularly true for Honiara, the 
capital of Solomon Islands. 
A common response of governments and 
donors worldwide to this situation has been the 
instigation of large-scale youth employment pro-
grams. These initiatives typically follow common 
modalities, their primary rationale being to assist 
the young unemployed find and/or undertake paid 
employment, both formal and informal. Yet despite 
the frequency of these programs, especially in 
post-conflict, fragile contexts, evidence of whether 
they actually help to reduce the ranks of the unem-
ployed remains, at best, tentative. Similarly, results 
are mixed — but perhaps more promising — when 
it comes to assessing their impact on social stability. 
This Discussion Paper is principally concerned 
with two ongoing youth employment programs 
in Honiara: the World Bank–supported ‘Rapid 
Employment Project’ (REP) and the ‘Youth at 
Work’ (Y@W) Program implemented and managed 
by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.1 
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Figure 1: Solomon Islands’ Urban Youth ‘Bulge’ and Rural Youth ‘Dent’, 2009 
Rural population pyramid by age (2009)
Source: Adapted from SIG (2013c); reproduced with permission of the National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance and Treasury, 
Solomon Islands Government.
Urban population pyramid by age (2009) 
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Setting the Scene: Youth in Solomon Islands
Solomon Islands, an archipelagic nation of around 
1000 scattered islands in the Southwest Pacific, is a 
fragile, post-conflict state.2 With a population of a 
little over half a million people, it is characterised 
by a large number of young people that are often 
undereducated, underemployed and increasingly 
urban. It has all of the hallmarks of a country experi-
encing a significant urban youth bulge (see Figure 1). 
According to the latest census, 60 per cent of the 
Solomon Islands population is aged 24 or under, 
with Honiara exhibiting similar dynamics, with 
around 56 per cent of the population being 24 or 
under (SIG 2013b). 
From 1998 to 2003, Solomon Islands experi-
enced a low-level civil conflict, locally known as 
‘the tension’. This period had a profound, although 
largely undocumented, impact on youth (Evans 
2016). Young people were key actors in the fighting 
that transpired, both as combatants and as victims. 
Many of today’s cohort of teens and those aged in 
their twenties were subject to or witnessed displace-
ment, violence, and a breakdown in government 
services, including education. The legacy of this 
episode of death, destruction and dislocation hangs 
heavily over the country today, although it is not 
commonly spoken about in public discourse, par-
ticularly amongst young people.
There is a widespread societal expectation in 
Solomon Islands that young people will attend 
school. Almost all children will undertake a period 
of primary schooling, although the quality is vari-
able with low functional literacy rates.3 At second-
ary school, enrolment and completion rates decline 
markedly. Large numbers of students are ‘pushed 
out’ — that is, fail to pass national examinations in 
order to proceed to higher levels of education — in 
standard/grade 6, form 3 and form 5.4 In 2005, it 
was reported that 40 per cent of the nation’s youth 
were ‘push outs’ (Ministry of Women, Youth and 
Children Affairs 2010). 
Those with minimal education levels face severe 
hardship when it comes to entering the formal 
labour market, with jobseekers vastly outstripping 
employment vacancies. It has been documented 
that there are 10,000 school leavers in Solomon 
Islands each year (Asian Development Bank 2016; 
Bartlett 2015; World Bank 2010b). While not lon-
gitudinal, government figures for the period 2012–
14 suggest that this may be an underestimate.5 
The number of new jobs generated by the formal 
economy per annum is equally difficult to quan-
tify. Although the figures fluctuate, from 2007 to 
2015 the national public service added an average 
of around 930 employees per annum.6 Using active 
National Provident Fund accounts from 2007 to 
2014 as a proxy for employment — a flawed meas-
ure — private and public sector employment grew 
by around 3200 positions per annum.7 That equates 
to a shortfall of over 6000 jobs for youth every year.
The prospect of future poverty awaits those 
with limited education, especially those residing in 
urban environments. The link between poverty and 
education levels in Solomon Islands has been dem-
onstrated by the country’s most recent poverty pro-
file (SIG 2015). It found that around 40 per cent of 
those defined as living in poverty reside in house-
holds in which the ‘head’ does not have at least six 
years of primary school education.8 As education 
levels increase, so too does the prospect of employ-
ment and moving out of poverty. 
Finding formal employment in Honiara is a 
difficult endeavour, especially for young people. It 
can entail responding to advertised positions and 
word-of-mouth offers, but school leavers rely more 
frequently upon the largesse of employed relatives 
and friends. There is only one employment agency, 
and very little reliable data on job market demand 
or supply within the city. So despite high levels 
of unemployment, employers anecdotally report 
difficulty finding people with the right skills to fill 
their vacancies.
There are no accurate formal unemployment 
figures for youth in Solomon Islands, with reported 
rates varying widely (see Close 2012). More reliable 
reports have suggested a youth unemployment rate 
of around 70 per cent. World Bank research con-
ducted in the ‘squatter settlement’ of White River, 
west Honiara, in 2010, found 67 per cent of youth 
reported that they had no regular source of cash 
employment — either formal or informal — and 
were seeking work (World Bank 2014). The Solo-
mon Islands National Youth Policy states that in 
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2005 the unemployment rate amongst those aged 
15 to 19 was 75 per cent (Ministry of Women, 
Youth and Children Affairs 2010; see also Jourdan 
2008). Reflective of this uncertainty, in 2016 the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) suggested 
a youth unemployment rate of, ‘above 35 percent’ 
(ILO 2016). Whatever the real situation, all of these 
figures would place the country amongst those with 
the highest youth unemployment rates in the world 
(see Antoniou and Dalla 2015). 
Rates of informal employment are similarly 
unknown, although census data would indicate 
that 37 per cent of the workforce earns a livelihood 
through informal means, such as selling betelnut, 
cigarettes, handicrafts and other consumables, par-
ticularly fruit and vegetables (Donnelly and Jiwanji 
2010; Maebuta and Maebuta 2008; World Bank 
2014).9 Informal work opportunities for young 
people are not well studied. It is known that casual 
cash-in-hand service provision is prolific across 
most age groups, especially amongst mature males, 
including building, carpentry, electrical work, 
transport services, small-scale timber extraction 
and mechanical repairs. House cleaning and child 
care are more typical carried out by women and girls.
Recognising that crime can be an occupa-
tion like any other, young people in particular are 
involved in the trade of illicit substances, with can-
nabis, kwaso and ‘black market’ alcohol sales being 
common.10 These can be highly lucrative as seen in 
Box 1, making the risks of detection incommen-
surate with the potential financial rewards. Theft, 
typically of a petty nature, is a further means which 
a minority of citizens, especially young people, 
employ to support themselves, or maintain their 
preferred lifestyles.11 
Creating Youth Livelihoods —  
The Challenges Ahead
Youth unemployment is considered a key develop-
ment and security issue. The link between jobless-
ness and criminality is well documented, with a 
significant amount of literature, often utilising vast 
datasets across a variety of contexts, pointing to a 
positive correlation between crime and unemploy-
ment.12 The association between employment and 
economic advancement is similarly well established. 
Youth unemployment in the Pacific region is said to 
represent a significant economic loss, calculated at 
approximately USD $828 million in 2011, increas-
ing to USD $3.18 billion by 2020 (SPC 2015b). 
Slow growth and job creation affect all age groups, 
but particularly young people who have a higher 
job turnover than adults and take longer to find 
employment (World Bank 2013a). 
A common refrain in post-conflict Solomon 
Islands has been the need to address youth unem-
ployment.14 In addition to higher-level policy com-
mitments, no fewer than eight public reports in the 
post-conflict period have made recommendations 
relevant to youth employment.15 Youth unemploy-
ment in the urban environment raises concerns 
around a number of issues which Urdal’s ‘youth 
bulge’ speaks to, including grievances linked to low 
rates of economic growth and the limited means 
by which young people can influence the political 
process (Urdal 2004). Within Solomon Islands such 
anxieties extend further, encompassing exclusion, 
boredom, substance abuse and violence. 
Box 1: Earning a Living from Illicit Trade 
The production and sale of kwaso is wide-
spread across most provinces in Solomon 
Islands and is particularly prolific in Honiara 
to the extent that it appears to have become 
a ‘normal’ livelihood strategy. Kwaso ‘cooks’ 
can be charged under the Liquor Act for mak-
ing liquor without the necessary approval. A 
husband and wife interviewed in mid-2016, at 
their home in a settlement on the eastern out-
skirts of Honiara, stated that their last ‘cook’ 
earnt them SBD $1100, over seven times the 
minimum weekly wage13 (excluding labour 
costs and following expenditure of around 
SBD $230 on ingredients). This was for mini-
mal labour input with a key appeal being the 
ability to generate ‘fast cash’, the fermenting 
and distillation process generally taking three 
to four days. Like cannabis, in some places in 
Solomon Islands kwaso has become a form of 
currency for the payment of services, particu-
larly manual work carried out by youth. 
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Popularly, unemployment in Solomon Islands 
is framed as a security imperative, with an under-
lying concern being that large numbers of unem-
ployed, urban youth, particularly males, will fuel 
future disorder, both public and private. And while 
the genesis of the tension has been attributed to a 
number of complex, underlying causes (see Allen 
et al. 2013), youth unemployment is not commonly 
cited as one of them; although some have suggested 
a link:
Unemployment creates demoralisation and 
has been identified by many observers as one 
of the underlying causes of the 1999–2000 
armed conflict (ACFOA 2000). ‘The bulk 
of Solomons youth has been schooled for 
non-existent urban jobs, effectively alienat-
ing them from their village resource base and 
branding them as failures in a system foreign to 
their lives’ (Roughan 2000). (Chevalier 2001)
Despite the above circumstances, it would be inap-
propriate to narrowly render ‘employment’ in Solo-
mon Islands to that most commonly experienced in 
developed countries. The Solomon Islands labour 
market functions differently. It is highly dualistic, 
characterised by a large, and mainly rural, informal 
sector and a small and predominantly Honiara-
based formal employment market. 
Employment in Solomon Islands does not 
strictly mean a full-time position in the public or 
private sector with a prescribed minimum wage 
and associated benefits. This is not to say that such 
arrangements will not exist in the future and will 
not remain important; however, they will be the 
exception, not being the path that the vast major-
ity of citizens will follow in order to earn an income 
and raise their living standards. And the youth 
labour market will remain particularly fraught, 
being largely informal, small, and characterised by 
instability as young people move in and out of work. 
The future development trajectory of Solomon 
Islands will also differ from various other coun-
tries that have transitioned from rural subsistence 
agriculture to economies based on export-driven 
manufacturing and services. A number of funda-
mental constraints related to geography, limited 
resource diversification and ‘weak governance 
and limited capacity for regulatory and economic 
policy reform’ (World Bank 2010b) mean that the 
Solomon Islands economy will, at least over the 
medium term, remain small and niche. The follow-
ing World Bank analysis (2014) encapsulates this: 
‘Pacific island countries are unlikely to experience 
export-driven development and associated employ-
ment creation of the scale and nature seen in much 
of the East Asia Pacific region, even with the best 
possible business environment.’ 
The economic reality for the vast majority of 
Solomon Islanders, including young people who are 
part of the estimated 80 per cent of the population 
residing in rural areas, is that reliance on small-
holder agriculture for their livelihoods will remain 
a constant over the medium to long-term.16 Person-
al consumption will, when the conditions are right, 
be supplemented by income generated from the sale 
of excess product. For this group the employment 
programs discussed in this paper are, in the main, 
irrelevant.17 Enhancing their livelihoods will require 
a whole different set of policy responses. 
Intricately linked with the above are the existing 
employment dynamics in Solomon Islands, or 
what can loosely be referred to as the ‘culture’ 
of employment. These are complex, unlikely to 
change anytime soon, and are of equal importance 
to young people as they are to adults. They, too, 
render a neat portrait of formal, ‘nine-to-five’ 
employment problematic. 
In contemporary Solomon Islands, particularly 
urban areas, many people, including the young, 
combine formal and informal income genera-
tion, or even opt out of secure formal employment 
because they can earn more from informal activi-
ties. Discussions with male youths in a settlement 
to the east of Honiara problematise the notion that 
obtaining full-time formal employment with an 
established business in Honiara is the Holy Grail of 
all young job seekers. A number of young people 
indicated that having found such employment they 
thereafter resigned, variously citing ‘stress’, a desire 
to ‘rest’, or the paucity of the wages as the reasons 
for doing so.18 
Further, a stigmatisation around certain jobs 
is evident amongst pockets of urban youth, also 
discouraging involvement in potential livelihood 
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activities. A focus group discussion with young 
people involved in the two employment programs 
discussed in this paper indicated a strong prefer-
ence for formal employment, especially ‘office 
work’, describing the ‘shame’ that attaches to activi-
ties such as street cleaning or grass cutting.19  
Casual ‘moonlighting’ on the side or running 
a business in addition to a full-time job in a gov-
ernment ministry or with a private company is not 
unusual in Honiara. Depending on the position, 
a job in the formal sector, especially with govern-
ment, can be leveraged to award (or block) all man-
ner of benefits to friends and family, including con-
tracts, permanent employment and promotions. Far 
from demonstrating inflexibility, the existing labour 
market in Solomon Islands is highly dynamic, 
periodic and creative. People may be economically 
inactive at one moment, and lucratively employed 
in a variety of legitimate and illegitimate ways the next.20 
A further feature of this discussion is the 
absence of a national policy dialogue around 
employment, or indeed, the long-term macro-
economic position of the country. Due, in part, 
to issues relevant to Solomon Islands’ political 
economy (see Haque 2012) the government course 
of action on many issues in Solomon Islands — 
beyond written documents — is often difficult to 
determine, with politics being acutely localised and 
personal. A coherent national approach to unem-
ployment (beyond what are largely generic aspi-
rational policy statements) is difficult to discern. 
An example of this is demonstrated by the latest 
National Development Strategy with its nonde-
script (and unrealistic) goal of, ‘full and produc-
tive employment and decent work for all women and 
men, including for young people’ by 2030 (SIG 2016). 
Common Approaches to  
Youth Employment Programs
Youth employment is a complex and challeng-
ing issue. It frequently involves a multipronged 
response encompassing a variety of macro- and 
micro-economic interventions. Presented here are 
three common government and donor-supported 
employment approaches for youth: skills training 
programs; demand-side labour programs, namely 
large-scale public works schemes; and entrepreneur 
capital programs. These initiatives, either stand-
alone, or more usually in combination, routinely 
feature in post-conflict, developing contexts, so 
much so that is has been said that ‘nearly every 
fragile state’ has adopted one of these approaches or 
a variation upon them (Blattman and Annan 2016). 
Solomon Islands is no exception. 
The logic behind adopting any one of the 
approaches described here, and others, is largely 
linked to context and the underlying objective/s of 
the intervention. Different initiatives typically focus 
on different parts of the youth employment prob-
lem. Accordingly, some programs are best targeted 
at informal employment (e.g. entrepreneur capi-
tal programs) while others are more appropriately 
directed towards formal employment (e.g. skills 
training which encompass business internships). 
While the three approaches discussed are com-
mon responses to youth unemployment, other ini-
tiatives which are not presented include: improv-
ing the general business and investment climate; 
introducing or easing regulations around the hir-
ing of young people, such as introducing a youth 
sub-minimum wage; microfinance provision for 
youth; and providing subsidies or other benefits 
to employers who hire youth. As discussed, any 
of the approaches outlined need to be assessed in 
the given context, in particular an understanding 
of what, if any, constraint/s exist within the labour 
market. Multiple constraints will mean utilising a 
blend of approaches. 
Skills Training Programs
Skills training provides job seekers with skills that 
will enhance their prospects of finding work. These 
can be technical, managerial, vocational, business 
and/or ‘soft skills’ (non-technical skills pertaining 
to, inter alia, social interaction, character and work 
ethic). The methods by which these skills are taught 
vary and commonly include classroom teaching, 
and/or on-the-job or vocational learning. 
Skills training is a common feature of employ-
ment programs and is a component of the two 
main Solomon Islands initiatives discussed in this 
paper. Its ubiquity is demonstrated by the fact that 
from 2002 to 2012 the World Bank and its client 
governments invested nearly USD $9 billion in 
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93 skills training projects, equating to nearly USD 
$100 million per project (Twose 2015, quoted in 
Blattman and Ralston 2015). 
International evidence tends to suggest that on 
balance the returns from skills training, of all types, 
are low relative to their costs. The reasons for this 
are not clear. Blattman and Ralston (2015) assess a 
handful of international examples of technical and 
vocational training programs and show a combina-
tion of high dropouts, modest or ambiguous effects 
on labour market outcomes, and high program 
costs. They question if the problem ‘is with the 
approach to training and the targeting of disadvan-
taged youth, or if the assumptions underlying the 
programs — that low skills and skills mismatches 
are impeding development in some countries — are 
themselves wrong’ (ibid.:10). 
An important feature of seemingly all youth 
employment initiatives in Honiara, and true of 
REP and Y@W, has been ‘soft skills’ training. These 
are sometimes referred to as ‘transferable skills’ 
(see Rankin et al. 2015). They are distinct from 
the other skills discussed and frequently encom-
pass social and emotional learning. Soft skills may 
include topics such as work culture, gender and 
diversity, healthy relationships and anger manage-
ment. Preliminary international evidence suggests 
that this type of cognitive behavioural training may 
be effective at reducing crime and violence, but less 
successful for employment outcomes. However, 
results remain difficult to discern. One of the most 
recent and comprehensive evidence gap evaluations 
of soft skills for youth in medium- to low-income 
countries suggests that, ‘more high-quality evidence is 
needed to inform’ the design of these programs (ibid.). 
In Honiara there is anecdotal evidence to sug-
gest that soft skills are especially valued by employ-
ers. In particular, employers have lamented the lack 
of employee readiness for work, highlighting the 
need for training in matters of work culture, behav-
iour and expectations. 
Demand-side Labour Intensive Programs
Demand-side labour programs are typically tem-
porary in nature and often follow a cookie-cutter 
modality, entailing short-term, low-skilled, labour-
intensive work for a minimum wage. These types 
of initiatives are most common in high unemploy-
ment contexts where supply-side initiatives (such 
as skills training) are of ‘little impact’ (World Bank 
2013a). An important feature of these types of pro-
grams is that they generate the work which partici-
pants undertake. In this regard, rather than operat-
ing to create sustainable employment they function 
as social safety nets and temporary income genera-
tors in hard times. 
Large-scale variations of these types of schemes 
have been carried out globally, often in low-income, 
post-conflict countries and they often employ 
tens or even hundreds of thousands. Solomon 
Islands’ REP — described in detail below — is a 
quintessential example of this type of program with 
its objectives of providing skills to participants, 
helping to distribute money in the form of wages, 
and providing small-scale infrastructure to 
disadvantaged communities. 
A number of assumptions flow from these 
demand-side initiatives, including that they will 
have a multiplier effect on local economies follow-
ing an injection of cash, and that credit-constrained 
participants will use earnings to invest in physical 
or human capital, such as skills, education or tools, 
to commence a small business. Despite their preva-
lence, evidence as to their performance is sparse: 
Strikingly, there is little to no rigorous, coun-
terfactual-based evidence of the effects of a 
workforce program in a low-income country. 
A range of casual, often descriptive evalua-
tions suggest that these programs help people 
boost their stock of savings or pay off debts. It 
is not clear, however, whether there are lasting 
effects on poverty or income-generation, or 
whether post-crisis programs help stimulate 
recovery. (Blattman and Ralston 2015:19)
The above assessment would generally accord 
with a limited number of World Bank evaluations 
(World Bank 2013a). In Argentina and Colum-
bia, impact evaluations of these types of demand-
side labour responses reported short-term posi-
tive income effects, ‘related to the income transfer 
received, but no information on post-program 
employment’ (ibid.:40). Yet typically the raison 
d’être of such programs is not post-program work, 
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with the rates of returns on infrastructure and 
wages being their primary justification. 
Entrepreneur Programs
Capital or credit entrepreneur programs, which 
often go by other titles, such as ‘capital-centric 
programs’, endeavour to stimulate employment 
by relieving capital burdens, a common feature 
of fragile states and particularly true of Solomon 
Islands. Capital comes in various forms, including 
cash transfers, in-kind (such as equipment) or 
credit. The objective is to encourage recipients 
to use the capital provided in order to set up or 
expand small businesses. This is frequently in 
combination with skills training, often in topics 
such as small business management, budgeting 
and business plan development. Supervision 
and mentoring is also a common feature of 
these initiatives. Depending on context, business 
initiatives which entrepreneur capital programs 
may seek to support include smallholder farming, 
petty trading and unskilled service provision. 
As elaborated upon in greater detail below when 
looking at the Honiara experience, the evidence of 
an increasing number of evaluations is that capital 
entrepreneur programs can stimulate self-employ-
ment in a cost-effective manner. These point to a 
combination of inputs being required, in particular 
both training and capital, particularly cash.
An Overview of Contemporary Youth 
Employment Programs in Honiara
In response to the context described, the Solomon 
Islands Government, with significant donor sup-
port, instigated REP in 2010 and Y@W in 2012. 
Both initiatives utilise different modalities when it 
comes to addressing urban youth unemployment, 
although they share a number of commonalities. 
Y@W and REP are simultaneously supply-side 
and demand-side. On the supply-side, each has 
components that provide skills training, while an 
aspect of Y@W entails small, non-cash capital for 
youth entrepreneurs. However, in the main, and in 
contrast to Y@W, REP is a classical demand-side 
project, increasing labour demand for participants 
through a variety of public works. 
Initiatives like REP and Y@W are not new to 
Honiara, although their scale is. One of the earli-
est organised youth employment schemes can be 
traced to the mid-1970s — the ‘Masta Liu Youth 
Project’. A modest and largely organic scheme, it 
shared a number of commonalities with its contem-
porary incarnations, focusing on addressing youth 
unemployment through skills training and the pro-
vision of a small wage and equipment to carry out 
agricultural work (Palmer 1979).
The Rapid Employment Project
The REP seeks ‘to assist targeted vulnerable urban 
populations’ primarily through short-term labour-
intensive activities, such as the construction of 
small-scale urban infrastructure and road rehabili-
tation and maintenance (World Bank 2010a). These 
works are created by the project. A second feature 
is classroom-based life skills and employment 
training, referred to as ‘pre-employment training’ 
(PET). This is directed towards improving partici-
pants’ ‘knowledge, experience and basic employ-
ment skills that are valued in the work place and 
society’ (ibid.:v). PET involves a week of classroom 
training following a syllabus designed by the pro-
ject. Participants in the public works component of 
REP must initially undertake PET. 
REP activities take place in Honiara, with a 
small number outside of the city boundary. It is 
funded through World Bank–administered trust 
funds and is managed and administered by Honia-
ra-based staff employed by the project’s implement-
ing agencies, the Honiara City Council and the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Development.
REP is not specifically cast as a youth employ-
ment initiative, although it does seek to have 50 
per cent youth participation, defined as those aged 
between 16 and 29. Over 2015 some 53 per cent of 
participants fell within this age group (REP 2016). 
And while REP seeks to foster ongoing employ-
ment, principally through the transfer of appropri-
ate skills and experience, it is largely concerned 
with distributing money in the form of wages and 
in providing small-scale urban infrastructure and 
services. Project documents disclose a belief that 
project activities would mitigate social unrest and 
instability (World Bank 2010a).
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REP involves community groups forming into 
teams and completing a written application to 
undertake work. This includes indicating the type 
of work they would like to do. Common activi-
ties include street cleaning and rubbish collection, 
cutting grass on roadsides, drain cleaning and the 
construction of ‘Jacob’s Ladders’ (see photograph). 
Reflecting the temporary nature of the work, typi-
cally participants work for 20 days, while those 
engaged on small-scale infrastructure initiatives, 
such as Jacob’s Ladders, will work on average 54 
days. Regular labourers are paid SBD $4 per hour, 
equal to Solomon Islands’ minimum hourly wage 
rate, while group leaders are paid SBD $5. 
As of the end of 2015 some 12,280 participants 
had taken part in the urban works and services 
component of REP, while a total of 11,558 had 
graduated from PET (REP 2016). 
The current phase of REP is due to come to 
end in December 2016, although additional financ-
ing will see it extended through to 2018. Plans are also 
underway for a follow-on project with a possible feature 
being an expansion to various provincial locations.
The Youth at Work Program
Y@W, unlike REP, is solely targeted at young peo-
ple, in particular, those that the program calls 
‘disengaged youth’. The development objectives of 
Y@W are not clearly defined in available project 
documentation.21 The principal modality adopted 
by Y@W is different from that of REP, it being 
largely concerned with on-the-job skills training, 
including mentoring. 
While Y@W is mostly Honiara-based, a varia-
tion of the program previously operated in Choi-
seul Province and in mid-2016 it expanded to Auki, 
the capital of Malaita Province. As at mid-2016, 
funding was drawn from a variety of non-govern-
ment organisation (NGO) and donor sources. The 
project is overseen and managed by the Secretariat 
of Pacific Communities. 
All participants in Y@W initially undertake 
80 hours of voluntary community service. Those 
who successfully complete this then take part in a 
two-week lecture-style training program (see pho-
tograph next page). This shares parallels with REP’s 
PET, including soft skills as described above. Partic-
ipants are then channelled into one of two streams, 
largely on the basis of self-selection.
The first, and most popular, stream involves the 
placement of participants in an internship, involv-
ing on-the-job mentoring. The internships, of 3 to 
12 months, may be with the private sector, NGOs, 
An example of a ‘Jacob’s Ladder’.
Source: Courtesy of REP
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donors or the public sector. In some instances, 
employers retain interns in either a full-time or 
part-time capacity. Interns are not paid, and there-
fore unlike REP the project is not concerned with 
income distribution, however, they do receive a 
modest stipend to pay for transport and sustenance. 
The second stream involves further training, 
and funding, in small business start-up. This is 
called the ‘Youth Entrepreneur Program’ and com-
menced in 2014. In Honiara, this involves a smaller 
number of participants than the internship com-
ponent. After a two-week period of business train-
ing following a syllabus tailored to the program by 
the ILO, and the development of a business plan, 
participants are given resources equivalent to SBD 
$2000 (approx. USD $260) to commence a busi-
ness. Examples of past businesses include mobile 
phone credit ‘top-up’ services, second-hand clothes 
sales, jewellery making, catering and T-shirt screen 
printing. 
Participants in Y@W are chosen on the basis 
of self-referral, turning up to advertised awareness 
sessions. As at August 2016, Y@W had reached its 
tenth phase. Each phase, typically two per annum, 
contains approximately 250 young people. In total, 
more than 2000 youth have participated in the 
internship component of the program. 
Y@W will continue until at least 2020 with donor 
support. It is hoped that the program will then tran-
sition into mainstream government programming. 
Performance of Solomon Islands’ 
Employment Programs
As at mid-2016, both REP and Y@W had been 
operational for around six and four years respec-
tively. During that time both have accumulated 
data directed towards assessing their performance. 
Given different modalities, it is difficult to 
make direct comparisons between the programs. In 
the case of REP, participation is open to both adults 
and youth, although data collected has not been 
adult/youth disaggregated. While the geographic 
focus of Y@W extends beyond Honiara data collec-
tion has not, nor has it focused on the entrepreneur 
component of the program. Both projects use vastly 
different indicators and employ different monitor-
ing and evaluation frameworks.
This part of the paper will draw on available 
data to examine how both projects have fared in 
terms of affecting youth employment levels in 
Honiara. In evaluating both programs, the discus-
sion will also encompass an examination of the 
extent to which programs like Y@W and REP can 
be said to contribute to reduced social instability. It 
needs to be noted that a constraint with the data of 
both programs is the lack of a control group. This 
hinders an ability to make credible findings and is 
discussed in further detail below.
Lecture-style training for participants at Y@W.
Source: Courtesy of Y@W.
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The Rapid Employment Project
The REP uses a number of key indicators to track 
how the project is performing. 
An important caveat in relation to REP, and in 
contrast to Y@W, was its planned short-term focus. 
When it was designed, REP was categorised as an 
‘emergency project’ to assist vulnerable Honiara 
communities from a deteriorating domestic fiscal 
position in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
According to project documentation it was not 
intended to be a long-term, sustainable endeavour: 
‘[t]he project was not designed with sustainability 
in mind and consequently, there are few initiatives 
to secure continuity of project gains’ (World Bank 
2013b). 
The two main measures used to track REP’s 
achievements against its development objectives 
are labour-days generated and wages transferred 
— indicators commonly used in large-scale public 
works programs. The latest data shows that since its 
inception to the end of 2015 the project had gen-
erated 657,400 labour-days and had transferred a 
total of USD $22.6 million in wages. This data is 
largely internally focused, not being particularly 
helpful to domestic policymakers, especially the 
labour-days generated count, with there being no 
comparative domestic data against which this figure 
can be measured. 
Of more relevance to this discussion is a semi-
annual survey which the project undertakes. This 
involves a group of enumerators surveying around 
500 to 650 REP participants. Those surveyed are 
randomly selected — drawn from the total pool of 
REP participants since its inception, although they 
must have completed their involvement in the pro-
ject at least six months prior to the survey. 
Looking at two semi-annual surveys, con-
ducted in August/September 2015 (survey five) 
and November 2014 (survey four), the following 
results are informative (Pacific Horizons Consulting 
Group 2015): 
  The vast majority of REP participants (84.4 per 
cent in survey five and 87.6 per cent in survey 
four) had not found employment after REP. 
 A minority of participants — 9 per cent from 
survey five and 16.5 per cent from survey four — had 
looked for work in the 30 days prior to the survey. 
 Only a minority of participants had saved wages 
they earnt from REP. This being 15.9 per cent 
from survey five and 22 per cent for survey four. 
 Earlier surveys would tend to indicate that partici-
pants are spending their income predominantly 
on food and clothing (World Bank 2013b). While 
a significant amount of participants have spent 
their income on ‘education’ it is not clear if this is 
for themselves or others. 
These results are perhaps to be expected given 
the nature of REP — it is a demand-side program 
concerned with short-term employment genera-
tion, income transfer, and the economic return on 
small-scale infrastructure and service provision. 
An ex ante economic analysis of REP points to the 
numerous positive economic impacts of the project 
(World Bank 2010a).22 The employment results for 
post-REP participants, however, are worse than any 
published formal employment figures for Solomon 
Islands, for both adults and youth.23 And there is no 
data on long-term employment outcomes. While 
it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, these find-
ings seem to suggest that most participants do not 
take part in REP as an immediate stepping stone to 
future employment, instead pursuing quick money 
for instant consumption. Accordingly, REP cor-
responds with the available international evidence 
around demand-side labour programs: there is a 
short-term positive income result linked to cash 
transfers but evidence on post-project employment 
is scant. 
The Youth at Work Program
The main method used by Y@W to track how the 
program has been performing is a series of bian-
nual tracer studies. This involves those who have 
undertaken internships (not the Youth Entrepre-
neur Scheme) completing an online survey com-
prising around 20 mixed qualitative and quantita-
tive questions. In addition, a series of focus group 
discussions have also been conducted with former 
interns. A number of employers involved in the 
program have been similarly surveyed. 
The first tracer study was conducted in March 
2013, with the last one prior to the publication of 
this paper taking place in April 2016. During that 
period respondents from new phases have been 
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cumulatively added, although as Table 1 shows, 
the number of survey participants has been slowly 
declining, especially following survey number four. 
The underlying finding of these surveys is that 
as at the last survey, number seven, some 24 per cent 
of intern participants, or roughly one in every four, 
were employed in either a full-time or part-time 
capacity, with around three quarters of those posi-
tions being with the employer with whom they had 
undertaken their internship. In practice, survey seven 
should include a cumulative figure of all participants 
to have taken part in Y@W up to that phase, how-
ever, as discussed below, this is not the case. 
Figure 2 shows that at each survey the employ-
ment figures have shifted, averaging around 33 per 
cent over the life of Y@W, or one in three survey 
participants having obtained full- or part-time 
work, mainly with the employer with whom they 
did their internship. The length of time they have 
remained in these positions is unknown. At the 
time of survey number three 38 per cent of par-
ticipants were employed, 35 per cent at survey five, 
26 per cent at survey six and 24 per cent at survey 
seven. It was suggested by some people spoken 
to during the preparation of this paper that this 
downward trend is indicative of Y@W saturat-
ing the low-skilled segment of the Honiara formal 
labour-market. However, an absence of data makes 
the reason/s for this scenario indiscernible. It may 
be the case that other factors are contributing to a 
declining uptake in employment. 
A further concern articulated in the Y@W 
tracer studies is that some employers may be tak-
ing advantage of what is essentially free labour, 
churning through participants by not retaining old 
ones and engaging new ones. Perversely, this may 
mean the program is having a regressive effect on 
employment generation with employers not hiring 
staff and instead using a free, readily available and 
replaceable labour source. There is no disincentive 
to this behaviour and it would be wrong to neces-
sarily view it as a negative occurrence. If the ration-
ale of Y@W is to maximise those exposed to the 
formal work environment with the belief that this 
improves employment prospects, then the program 
is achieving its goal. To this end, employers may 
believe they are doing the right thing by engag-
ing as many participants as possible. To fully assess 
employer motivations around this issue would 
require further enquiry. 
An absence of longitudinal data makes it dif-
ficult to discern the success of Y@W in terms 
of long-term formal employment outcomes. As 
each new survey has been conducted, there has 
been a significant drop in the number of partici-
pants taking part from previous phases of the pro-
gram. Accordingly, by survey number seven none 
of the earlier interns (phases one to four) were 
being traced. Potentially, those who have recently 
completed their internship are more likely to be 
employed, whereas those who completed their 
internship a year, or several years, earlier are less 
likely to be in work, serving to skew the figures.24 
Given the above limitations, it is difficult to 
compare Y@W employment results with available 
employment data for Solomon Islands. Potentially, 
the different composition of the samples involved 
also mean that comparisons between program 
employment outcomes and economy-wide employ-
ment outcomes should be treated with a degree of 
Table 1: Youth at Work Tracer Study Overview 





Date No. of Youth 
Surveys Completed




1 1 February 2013 126 84 34
2 1&2 August 2013 210 92 50
3 1 to 3 Feb/March 2014 194 122 29
4 1 to 4 Sept/Oct 2014 213 205 75
5 1 to 5 March/April 2015 190 190 81
6 1 to 6 September 2015 154 154 31
7 1 to 7 April 2016 140 N/A 47
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caution.25 Nevertheless, if it is accepted that around 
33 per cent of Y@W participants are obtaining 
work then this figure is a worse result than the 
national average for 15–24 year olds, with Close 
(2012), on the basis of 2009 census figures, indi-
cating an employment rate of 43 per cent for this 
age group. Accepting the lowest published youth 
employment rates (see above) ranging from 25 to 
33 per cent, then the program is in line with these 
figures or may be doing marginally better. 
As is the case with REP, these results are not 
particularly surprising. International studies have 
found that formal employment skills programs sim-
ilar to Solomon Islands efforts do not greatly affect 
employment outcomes. 
In the period immediately following their 
internship, participants have been positive about 
finding work. It is less clear if, or how, this attitude 
changed over time given the limitations with the 
data. Consistently, survey and focus group partici-
pants were of the belief that their biggest hurdle to 
finding work was a lack of experience and/or lim-
ited education. In this regard, a positive outcome 
of Y@W has been its demonstrative effect, helping 
some participants realise that they need to acquire 
additional skills should they wish to enter the for-
mal labour employment. 
Evaluating the Honiara Employment 
Programs
At the outset, it needs to be noted that globally the 
evidence in this space is lacking. This is especially 
so for countries like Solomon Islands. The World 
Bank has commented that there is ‘little evidence of 
the impact on youth-targeted programs in labour-
abundant, low-income countries with weak institu-
tions’, with the evidence that does exist suggesting 
that they are ‘less likely to be effective, and pro-
grams targeting formal employment may be regres-
sive’ (World Bank 2013a). The following analysis 
generally accords with this observation. 
In Solomon Islands an initial question is wheth-
er the training being provided by the programs (in 
all forms — classroom, on-the-job mentoring — 
and encompassing all topics) actually leads to an 
increase in formal or informal employment. Blatt-
man and Ralston (2015) state: ‘The success of all of 
these supply-side programs depends on getting the 
diagnosis right: that these market failures or con-
straints actually exist, are binding, and that reliev-
ing them is enough to increase some employment.’
As concerns formal employment, is a lack of 
skills of the type being provided by REP and Y@W 
a binding constraint on employers taking on addi-
tional workers in Solomon Islands? There is no 
Figure 2: Y@W Participant Employment (Full Time and Part Time) 
Source: Pasifiki Services Ltd (various dates): Tracer Study Reports 1 to 7.
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evidence to suggest that this is the case. To put this 
another way: there is an absence of data suggest-
ing that employers will engage more employees if 
such employees possess the skills that the programs 
are providing. Again, the lack of a counterfactual 
severely limits the ability to answer this question 
— foremost, it hinders an informed assessment of 
whether employees would have engaged staff irre-
spective of the various programs. 
Available evidence on skills gaps in Solomon 
Islands would tend to show that these occur at 
the opposite end of the job market: the technical 
and the professional (although not exclusively). 
These include life-science and health profession-
als; extraction and building trades workers; teach-
ers; retail and other services managers; science 
and engineering professionals; and physical and 
engineering science technicians (Curtain 2013). In 
contrast, the spectrum of the jobs market which 
both programs are targeting is characterised by an 
abundance of supply. In the case of Y@W this is 
potentially problematic as employers have a ready 
supply of adults who can undertake the same work 
as young people. An omission of either program 
— particularly Y@W — to examine whether tar-
get employers see a lack of skills as a constraint to 
investment remains a missing piece of the puzzle. 
In post-conflict Solomon Islands the soft skills 
that both REP and Y@W impart are potentially 
important, although impacts are hard to measure. 
It is likely that these skills do not affect employ-
ment (there is no evidence to suggest that they do), 
but are seemingly important in terms of deterring 
crime and violence and contributing to social sta-
bility — attributes which do indirectly impact upon 
the employment conditions of the country, with a 
peaceful environment being conducive to business. 
While there is no hard data on the outcome 
of these soft skills in Solomon Islands, emerging 
international evidence, which Blattman and Ralston 
(2015) describe as ‘promising but nascent’, points 
to a positive correlation between soft skills and 
reduced violence and crime. They refer to a number 
of studies from Africa and the United States to sup-
port their argument (see also, Blattman et al. 2015). 
It would be wrong to overestimate the import of 
these findings — being preliminary and from vastly 
different contexts, such that their application to 
Honiara is not readily apparent. Further evidence is 
needed, particularly from within Melanesia. 
Equally, there is no evidence that the skills 
training provided by the programs is leading to 
an increased uptake in informal employment. 
This analysis is of most relevance to the Young 
Entrepreneurs component of Y@W. If Solomon 
Islands is anything like the international 
experience, it is unlikely that the skills being 
imparted under the Solomon Islands programs will 
see participants make a decision to start or expand 
a business. According to recent available evidence, 
vastly more important in contexts akin to Solomon 
Islands is the provision of capital. Blattman and 
Annan (2016) outline an example from Liberia. 
Their evaluation found successful outcomes on 
various measures from a project aimed at high-
risk men: ex-combatants, those occupying rural 
resource enclaves, and other rural ‘hotspots’. The 
program provided a mixture of skills training and 
a capital/cash injection or, indeed, the prospect of 
a future cash injection.26 The results reinforced the 
authors’ theoretical model: ‘if people are poor and 
credit-constrained then the return to skills alone 
will be low’ (ibid.:15). 
This analysis invites the question of whether 
providing capital is likely to increase employment 
prospects in Solomon Islands. Again, owing to a 
lack of data it is not possible to answer this ques-
tion. However, an argument can be made that capi-
tal, particularly in the form of cash, is a constraint 
to commencing a business in Honiara, especially 
for young people. Within Solomon Islands bank 
credit is non-existent for the unemployed. Outside 
of the largesse of family and friends, this potentially 
leaves sourcing finance to formal and informal 
moneylenders on unfavourable terms. 
The advantages of providing capital is support-
ed by a growing number of studies showing that 
the poor have high returns to capital investment. 
Blattman and Ralston (2015) present several inter-
national examples which suggest that the provision 
of cash, both conditional and non-conditional, is 
likely to stimulate self-employment in a cost-effec-
tive manner. They also refute concerns that par-
ticipants will misuse transfers, pointing to recent 
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evidence from 19 studies around the world which 
‘found almost no evidence of increased spending 
on alcohol, tobacco, or other “temptation goods”’ 
(ibid.:14–15).27
Finally, returning to a further question raised in 
the introduction: do these programs result in less 
crime and violence? While ensuring social stability 
was a key motivation behind the implementation 
of REP, the answer to this question is unknown for 
Solomon Islands. Anecdotal and individual case 
studies would suggest that for some participants the 
structure provided by the programs, particularly 
Y@W, does result in various lifestyle changes, such 
as reduced alcohol and drug intake. 
Accepting that people will rationally seek the 
most lucrative and stable work available, if crime 
pays then it is unlikely that participants will forego 
this income source altogether, even if involved in 
other licit activities (Blattman and Ralston 2015). 
The Liberian example discussed above is demon-
strative. This provided training and capital inputs 
to ‘high-risk men’ in an effort to shift them away 
from illegal activities and mercenary recruitment. 
The authors found that higher returns from farm-
ing (even small higher returns) did lead to a change 
in participants’ behaviour, there being less incentive 
for crime and mercenary work, although involve-
ment in illicit activities did not cease completely 
(Blattman and Annan 2016). This scenario shares 
some parallels with preliminary fieldwork con-
ducted by the author in 2016 on illicit livelihoods 
in Honiara, with the majority of kwaso produc-
ers spoken to combining their illicit trade with 
licit means of income generation, both formal and 
informal. For others, illicit activities would typically 
be engaged in when additional household finances 
were required, usually for one-off expenditure. 
A recent examination of the impact on crime of 
the largest demand-side public works program in 
the world, the Mahatma Gandhi National Employ-
ment Guarantee Scheme of India, found that 
employment generated by the program saw a decline 
in both property and violent crimes, although the 
impact was minimal (Das and Mocan 2016).28 
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The above analysis together with the further appli-
cation of international evidence has potential policy 
implications relevant to the programs discussed and 
measures directed towards reducing youth unem-
ployment in Honiara. Given the state of available 
evidence, recommendations in this space remain 
tentative and further programming would benefit 
from additional empirical enquiry around a num-
ber of issues, some of which are raised below.  
First, greater emphasis should be placed on 
informal employment programs. The international 
experience would tend to suggest that for an econ-
omy like Solomon Islands an entrepreneurial or 
capital-centric approach should take priority over 
formal employment programs, or, at the very least, 
be of equal relevance. 
For example, the skills training components of 
both REP and Y@W place disproportionate empha-
sis on formal employment given the Solomon 
Islands context where most opportunities exist in 
the informal sector. Out of 30 topics taught dur-
ing PET, only three explicitly relate to self-employ-
ment.29 The initial two-week Y@W training is simi-
larly concerned with the formal (although it has a 
separate business training course for those under-
taking the Youth Entrepreneur Scheme).
Y@W is only distributing data around its for-
mal employment (internship) component, there 
being no knowledge of how those young people 
who have participated in the Youth Entrepreneur 
Scheme have fared. And both programs invest in 
CV writing and job finding assistance, measures 
that are only of relevance to those seeking employ-
ment in the formal sector.
Neither program provides ongoing monitoring 
and advice for those involved in informal income-
generation activities, although Y@W is seeking to 
do so. Finally, in what is an interesting footnote, a 
small number of participants who have managed to 
secure employment under the internship program 
of Y@W have left it in order to commence their 
own business.30
Second, experimentation with entrepreneur-
ship should be considered. As part of the focus 
on the Young Entrepreneurs component of Y@W, 
thought could be given to encouraging greater 
diversification in informal activities. In Honiara, 
these appear to be narrowly focused with some 
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activities not being sufficiently directed towards 
market demand. A clear understanding of prospec-
tive markets is crucial. Cash-constrained urban 
youth selling to similarly cash-constrained urban 
youth will not yield significant, long-term returns. 
A good alternative may be activities which target 
the aid economy, are niche, or which have a wide 
and stable consumer-base (and do not crowd out 
existing businesses).31 This is an area where addi-
tional analytical work around market demand 
would likely assist prospective participants. 
Experimentation around credit, especially cash 
transfers, could also be contemplated. The method 
by which this is done would vary according to 
the nature of the employment program. It could 
include increasing the amount of credit provided 
in given circumstances (increased credit for high-
risk ventures) or testing periodic conditional cash 
transfers (providing transfers for ‘high risk’ partici-
pants if they do not fall foul of the law, or providing 
additional cash to entrepreneurs when they meet 
business targets). There is international evidence to 
suggest this could be a fruitful area to trial. 
Third, the failure to collect longitudinal 
data and implement a control group is a missed 
opportunity. The scale of the programs described 
are unprecedented in Solomon Islands with the 
involvement of around 9000 youth to mid-2016. A 
largely missed opportunity to date has been around 
learning. Little is publicly known about the impact 
that these programs have had on youth employ-
ment and social stability: what has worked and 
what hasn’t? 
In particular, the omission of both programs to 
use a control group has severely affected the util-
ity of the data collected and means there is little 
understanding of what dynamics drive certain seg-
ments of Honiara’s formal and informal employ-
ment markets. Further, there is little evidence that 
the data that has been collected has been analysed 
and effectively fed into the policymaking commu-
nity so that learning can occur. There are also areas 
around which there are significant data gaps. A 
non-exhaustive list of examples is provided in Box 2. 
Fourth, at present there is insufficient evi-
dence to support the expansion of either program, 
at least in their current forms, beyond Honiara 
and its peri-urban environment. There are seem-
ingly cogent reasons to expand youth employment 
programs beyond Honiara. As seen, the Solomon 
Islands rural economy engages the vast majority of 
the populace, a position that will not change any-
time soon. However, leaving aside issues related to 
economies of scale, two arguments would suggest 
that directing scarce resources to Honiara and its 
surrounding areas offers the best potential return 
for investment and should take precedence over 
rural expansion. 
First, and despite government aspirations, 
there is no prospect of reversing the rural to urban 
(Honiara) migration of young people in Solomon 
Islands. Young people are coming for a variety of 
reasons, with education and employment being 
key pull factors. Figure 1 above shows the extent 
Box 2: Examples of Data Gaps in Honiara’s 
Youth Employment Programs 
 Are formally employed youth carrying out 
jobs ‘on-the-side’? If so, what jobs and why? 
 Is involvement in illicit activities reduced by 
involvement in licit activities? For youth at 
risk, have the programs reduced delinquency 
in the form of contact with police or other 
relevant state agencies?
 Are treatment groups which have had skills 
training earning more than control groups? 
Are treatment groups applying the skills they 
have learnt? 
 Has involvement in formal or informal 
employment had a demonstrative affect 
amongst participants’ unemployed peers? 
 Do participants in entrepreneur programs 
earn more and remain in business longer if 
they receive follow-up mentoring compared 
with those who receive no such assistance?
 Are certain areas of the formal and infor-
mal economy employing more youth than 
others? 
 What is happening to the youth that have 
been engaged in these programs in terms of 
employment and livelihoods? If they remain 
employed formally or informally can this in 
anyway be attributable to the programs? 
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to which an exodus from rural areas is occurring, 
especially amongst those aged 15–30. This is caus-
ing the ‘bulge’ in the urban population pyramid, 
and the ‘dent’ in the rural population pyramid. 
Assuming that by 2050 the Honiara popula-
tion has caught up with the urban global average of 
50 per cent, the city would be home to more than 
600,000 people — surpassing the total population 
of the country on latest census data (Evans 2015).32 
Efforts to expand Honiara’s boundary have been 
resisted by contiguous landowners, meaning this fig-
ure would largely be squeezed into 22 square kilo-
metres, with spill over onto unserviced customary 
land. This scenario would appear to encompass all 
of the ingredients for future conflict: a large, youth-
ful, urban population; heightened pressure on land 
and services; and labour bottlenecks. 
Second, to the extent that these programs are 
responsive to social stability, international evidence, 
and past experience from Solomon Islands, suggests 
that future conflict will be an urban phenomenon. 
Over the last decade, numerous strategists, scholars 
and development institutions have begun focus-
ing on a future where group violence is principally 
an urban occurrence (see, for example, Beall et al. 
2011). The only significant urban site in Solomon 
Islands is Honiara; a place where predictable, epi-
sodic street violence dating back to the 1970s and 
often involving thousands of male youth is, argu-
ably, showing signs of becoming normalised. 
Finally, a careful eye needs to be kept on issues 
of cost and duplication. There are features of the 
two programs that appear to duplicate one another, 
as well as other smaller youth employment initia-
tives in Honiara. Potentially, economies of scale 
could be achieved by merging the two programs 
or, at the very least, components of the two. While 
REP’s PET ceased in the first half of 2016, the class-
room skills training that both programs have deliv-
ered seems a prime candidate for integration. As of 
August 2014, REP has provided a careers coach and 
set up a referral service including a resource centre 
equipped with computers for CV writing. These 
are services that Y@W also provides. The crossover 
seems clear and the potential for integration obvi-
ous (should REP continue such services beyond 
2016). Other existing and prospective initiatives 
in Honiara could also benefit from an integrated 
approach to addressing youth work, and it may be 
the case that a new or existing government agency 
specifically mandated to address youth employment 
would be best placed to lead this coordination.33
While the international evidence around youth 
employment programming remains sparse, this 
paper has suggested that the Solomon Islands pro-
grams presented generally conform with contexts 
similar to Honiara. As the population of the capital 
continues to grow, the issues outlined will take on a 
level of increased importance. 
One of the key challenges moving forward will 
be to compile a robust evidence base on which to 
build future programming. While this paper has 
examined two Honiara-based employment inter-
ventions, a missing piece of the puzzle for Solomon 
Islands — beyond the scope of this paper — is 
a comprehensive assessment of what particular 
modality, scale, temporal frame and cohort of par-
ticipants is best suited to addressing the country’s 
youth unemployment situation. Given the diver-
sity and number of employment and skills train-
ing initiatives that have been undertaken globally, 
and the pressing urgency of youth unemployment 
in Solomon Islands, particularly Honiara, this is a 
question that is highly current and, as this paper 
has attempted to impart, for which there is a critical 
need for further evidence-based enquiry.
And, importantly, moving forward, expectations 
will need to be kept in check. It has been argued 
that a focus on full-time, formal employment in the 
public or private sector will only ever have limited 
success in Honiara. In this regard, the situation fac-
ing Solomon Islands today is no different from that 
presented by Chevalier (2001) some 15 years ago: 
‘[u]niversal … employment [is] a fantasy that needs 
debunking’. Given this situation, it has been con-
tended that efforts to tackle youth unemployment 
in the capital, and the country, will need to adopt 
less conventional policy approaches and focus 
on areas where Solomon Islands has established 
strengths and advantages, such as the informal 
sector. Even so, unemployment will remain a per-
manent state of affairs for pockets of the country’s 
population, particularly uneducated, urban youth. 
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Endnotes
1 For policy purposes, the Solomon Islands 
Government’s definition of youth is ‘persons between 
14 years of age and 29 years of age, inclusive’ 
(Ministry of Women, Youth and Children Affairs 
2010). Unless otherwise stated, this paper adopts the 
same definition.
2 Falling within the World Bank’s ‘harmonized list of 
fragile situations’. Fragile situations include countries 
with a harmonised ‘Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment’ (CPIA) rating of 3.2 or less. In FY 2016, 
Solomon Islands’ CPIA rating was 3.1. 
3 According to the Solomon Islands Ministry of 
Education and Human Resource Development 
(MEHRD), in 2013 Solomon Islands has a net 
primary enrolment rate of 88.85 per cent (MEHRD 
2013a). (Enrolment does not correlate with 
attendance.) Figures for 2010 indicate that 68 per cent 
of students had below satisfactory functional literacy 
and numeracy levels (Close 2012).
4 In 2008, the push out rate was said to be 26 per 
cent for junior secondary schools (more than 5000 
students) and 63 per cent for senior secondary school 
(more than 6800 students): (Ministry of Women, 
Youth and Children Affairs 2010).
5 This data shows a drop of around 17,700 student 
enrolments in standard/grade 1 to form 6 enrolments 
(SIG 2013b). On average 20,000 students have been 
enrolled in standard 1 over that period, while only 
2600 are enrolled in form 6, meaning vast numbers 
are not progressing through primary and secondary 
schooling.
6 Based upon unpublished figures provided by 
the Solomon Islands Ministry of Public Service 
(December 2015).
7 Based upon annual ‘active’ NPF accounts as at 
December each year (2007–14), excluding ‘slow 
active’ and ‘inactive’ accounts. Sourced from 
unpublished figures provided by the Central Bank 
of Solomon Islands. NPF is the compulsory national 
provident/superannuation fund to which all 
employers in Solomon Islands are required to register 
their employees and pay contributions. In reality, this 
does not occur with various sectors being particularly 
prone to not registering staff, such as the private 
security industry and domestic services.
8 Poverty being based on, ‘the minimum expenditures 
needed to obtain basic food and non-food goods 
taking into account prevailing consumption patterns 
in the country’ (SIG 2015) . 
9 Betelnut is the nut of the fruit of the Areca palm tree. 
The nuts are chewed and combined in the mouth 
with crushed lime. Chewing has a mild stimulant 
effect. 
10 Kwaso is a homemade distilled alcohol introduced 
in Solomon Islands in the mid-1990s. ‘Black market’ 
is a reference to the ubiquitous, around-the-clock 
roadside markets that mainly sell beer without a 
government-issued liquor license. The livelihood 
activities described here are far from exclusively a 
youth phenomenon.
11 With a recent World Bank study (which the 
author was involved in) finding that petty theft 
was widespread across Solomon Islands, in some 
communities being ‘rampant and of constant concern’ 
(Allen et al. 2013).
12 For an overview of the evidence in this space see, for 
example, Das and Mocan 2016. 
13  Based upon a 38-hour working week at SBD $4 per 
hour (being the minimum hourly wage rate for all 
Solomon Islander employees except forestry and 
fisheries workers). At the time of publication, SBD $1 
was equivalent to approximately AUD $0.17. Returns 
increase with the number of ‘pots’ employed (gas 
cylinders used as part of the distillation process). In 
the scenario described here two pots were used.    
14  Pursuant to the Labour Act (Solomon Islands) (s.84) 
the minimum working age in Solomon Islands is 12 
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(for a list of defined jobs), an age previously criticised 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child as being 
too low (UNCRC 2003: para 19(c)).
15 See, Solomon Islands TRC 2012, III:769; Jayaweera 
and Morioka 2008:98; Jourdan 2008; Ministry of 
Women, Youth and Children’s Affairs 2010; Noble 
et al. 2011:115; SIG 2006:27; SPC 2015a:24–27; and 
World Bank 2014.
16 According to the latest census some 32 per cent of 
the population aged 12 years and older in rural areas 
were subsistence workers, compared with 2 per cent 
in urban centres (SIG 2013c). 
17 It is acknowledged that often employment creation 
programs will target agricultural livelihoods, 
particularly in rural areas, although this is not the 
case for the Honiara-based programs discussed in this 
paper.
18 These discussions, taking place between June and 
August 2016, were conducted as part of the author’s 
PhD fieldwork. 
19 This focus group was conducted in July 2016 and 
included eight participants who had either taken part 
in REP or Y@W. 
20 Dr Michael Goddard 28/2/2016. Honorary Associate, 
Department of Anthropology, Macquarie University, 
personal communication.
21 In the first quarter of 2016 Y@W was seeking a 
Program Design Specialist with one of their tasks 
being to clarify, ‘the program’s Theory of Change and 
primary purpose’ and ‘prepare a new Program Design 
Document’ (Cardno 2016).
22 A key finding being that the REP would deliver 
economic benefits of between USD $0.48 and $0.85 to 
the poor for every dollar of expenditure (World Bank 
2010a). 
23 Program and economy-wide comparisons need to be 
treated with a degree of caution. See endnote 25.
24 To some extent this is supported by the available data. 
For example, survey number five discloses that of the 
seven survey participants from survey number one 
who were still being tracked, none were employed. 
The drop-out of survey participants has been 
attributed to difficulties generating sufficient interest 
or incentives for former Y@W participants to attend 
to completing the survey.
25 It could be argued that participants in the Y@W 
program are not reflective of the overall youth 
demographic, with the program catering for 
those that are ‘disengaged’, which may mean 
those exhibiting worse employment outcomes 
and prospects than the wider youth community. 
However, in practice both programs accept any youth 
who applies to take part. In the case of Y@W this 
includes those from standard/grade 6 to university 
graduates. Although the program does actively seek 
out those with a disability and former prisoners, 
a small minority of total program participants. 
REP participation is largely on the basis of place of 
residence. Difficulties with comparisons may also 
arise owing to differences between the age range of 
participants in the two programs and that for which 
Solomon Islands’ youth employment data has been 
collated.
26 This comprised the two-tiered provision of 
mainly agricultural tools/supplies and for various 
participants an untied amount of USD $50.  
27 See Evans and Papova (2014) referenced in Blattman 
and Ralston (2015).
28 The crimes analysed were: murder, kidnapping and 
abduction, robbery, burglary, theft, and unlawful 
assembly and rioting. The magnitude of the impact 
of the program on crime ranged from -0.03 to -0.08 
for property crimes and -0.03 to -0.04 for violent 
crimes (Das and Mocan 2016). More information on 
the scheme, in operation since 2006, can be found at: 
<www.nrega.nic.in>. 
29 These relate to: ‘i). the importance of budget, with 
emphasis on savings and use of bank accounts; 
ii). starting an income generating project; and iii). 
preparing profit and loss reports’ (ABU Consult 
Berlin GmbH 2011). 
30 This was 3 per cent according to Tracer Study number 
7 (Pasifiki Services Ltd).
31 For a discussion of how the aid economy can 
potentially be harnessed in Solomon Islands (in 
relation to women, but equally applicable to youth) 
see Haque and Greig 2010.
32 Based on a population of 1.3 million using a ‘medium 
population scenario’ (SIG 2013c).  
33 For example, since 2011 World Vision has 
implemented the ‘Honiara Youth Development, 
Employment and Small Enterprise Project’ which also 
includes a classroom-style skills training component.
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